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MACROECONOMIC RESPONSES BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO CHANGES IN 
EXTERNAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
ABSTRACT 
The paper presents a non-technical survey of some of the issues 
involved in the design of stabilization policy in developing countries 
with special emphasis on policy responses to external shocks. First, 
the six most important external economic parameters of developing 
countries are reviewed: 1) the terms of trade, 2) the growth of world 
markets, 3) the cost and availability of private external finance, 
4) the cost and availability of official and other concessional finance, 
including aid, 5) the world rate of inflation and 6) the exchange rates 
between the currencies of the major industrial countries. 
The paper then reviews the macroeconomic policy arsenal and the 
demand and supply effects of the various policy instruments (monetary 
and credit policy, the entire array of fiscal instruments, exchange 
rate policy, the use of exchange and capital controls and income policy). 
Finally there is a discussion of stabilization responses to four external 
shocks: a deterioration in the terms of trade, a slowdown in the rate 
of growth of export demand, an increase in the interest rate at which 
developing countries borrow abroad and an increase in the external rate 
of inflation. The prevalence of repressed financial markets and credit 
rationing makes effective demand and effective supply responses to 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy quite different from what 
they are in most of the industrial world. 
Macroeconomic Responses by Developing Countries to Changes in 
* External Economic Conditions 
Introduction 
Policy responses by developing countries to changes in the external 
economic environment can conceptually be subdivided into macroeconomic 
stabilisation policy and structural adjustment policy. 1 Stabilization 
policy aims to influence (and, one hopesi to minimize) deviations from 
full employment equilibrium or full capacity utilization equilibrium. 
Structural adjustment policy or allocative policy aims to influence the 
full employment equilibrium configuration itself. 2 
While the distinction between stabilisation policy and structural 
adjustment policy is clear in principle, in practice lboth in the real 
world and in the "practice" of the theoretical models we tend to work 
with) virtually every fiscal, financial, monetary or regulatory policy 
* James Tobin, Gustav Ranis, Richard Nelson and Merton J; Peck made very
helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1This section draws on Buiter [1984]. 
? 
~Note that according to this definition there can be no stabilization 
policy in the instantaneous Walrasian equilibrium models of the New 
Classical School. It is possible to modify the definition by 
differentiating between a "full information" equilibrium, i.e. an 
equilibrium in which agents possess complete information on all relevant 
contemporaneous and past endogenous and exogenous variables, and an 
incomplete information equilibrium. Even in the hyperactive 
invisible-hand models of the New Classical School, alternative budgetary
and financial policy rules can, ih general, alter the information 
content of currently observed endogenous variables such as prices and 
thus influence the deviation of the actual from the full information 
equilibrium. (Turnovsky [19801, Weiss [1980] 1 Buiter [1980, 1981], King
[19821, Marini [1985)). Such "stabilization" policy can then be 
distinguished from allocative policy actions or rules which aim to 
influence the full information equilibrium itself. 
2 
action will have both stabilisation and allocative (and indeed also 
distributional) consequences. Consider e.g. a policy of cutting 
exhaustive public spending on goods and services and reducing tax rates 
simultaneously, in such a way as to keep the public sector deficit 
constant. The objectives are the allocative or structural adjustment 
ones of freeing resources for private absorption and of creating more 
favorable tax incentives for the supply of effort. If there is any 
merit in the balanced budget multiplier theorem, this budgetary action 
will have contractionary stabilization consequences. The distributional 
consequences both of the spending cuts and of the tax reductions are 
likely to be important but are seldom analyzed satisfactorily. 
Unintended longer-term allocative consequences from public spending cuts 
are possible if the important distinction between current and capital 
spending is overlooked and exhaustive spending cuts fall 
disproportionately on public sector capital formation. 
One operationally useful but not completely satisfactory way of 
fleshing out the distinction between stabilisation and structural 
adjustment is the following. Macroeconomic stabilisation policy 
concerns monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, exchange control, capital 
control and incomes policy actions within the historically given 
institutional framework and the domestic and international market 
3 
3structure. 
Structural adjustment policy concerns changes in the institutional 
framework and in the laws, rules and regulations that govern property 
rights, liability, incentives and the flow of information, which 
together constitute the parameters within which production, exchange and 
distribution take place. Structural adjustment is about changes in 
regime. Macroeconomic stabilization policy is about policy actions 
within a regime, that is for a given institutional framework and a given 
market structure and/or non-market allocation and distribution 
. 4 mec han1sm. 
A problem with this characterization is that it suggests that 
stabilisation policy actions can always be implemented more swiftly than 
structural adjustment policy actions and that they have short-run 
effects only, i.e. effects which do not last longer than a typical 
3There is a rich and varied literature on stabilization policy in 
developing countries. Important references are Diaz-Alejandro [1965, 
1981, 1983], Kapur [1976], Bruno [19791, Cline and Weintraub eds. 
(1981] 1 Taylor (1981}, Schydlowsky [1981] 1 Dornbusch [1982, 1985b], 
Branson [19831. 
The role of the IMF in macroeconomic adjustment in developing countries 
is discussed in J, Williamson [1982 1 1983 ied.)], J. Muns, ed. [19841, 
T. Killick, ed. [1982 1 1984a, bl, A Crockett [1981), A Buira [1983], P. 
Keller (1980], Khan and Knight [1981, 1982], Katseli [19831, Branson 
[1984], IMF [1985], Goldstein and Montiel (1985]. The evolution of the 
Fund's views up to 1977 can be found in IMF (1977]. 
4~ ~ee also Lal [1984]. 
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business cycle. While monetary stabilization policy can, in most 
countries, be adjusted promptly, fiscal stabilisation policy often is 
the prisoner of unwieldy budgetary procedures. The "inside lag• of 
fiscal policy may therefore range from weeks to years. To the extent 
that stabilisation policy affects domestic capital formation, its 
effects may be long-lasting instead of merely cyclical. 
Structural adjustment may be a long drawn-out process (e.g. 
achieving a significant change in the sectoral composition of production 
and employment) or a once-off shift of short duration (replacing a 
system of price controls for a single commodity by one of subsidies and 
a market-determined price). The administrative and expert knowledge 
required for the design and implementation of successful stabilisation 
policy is not a world removed from that necessary for an effective 
structural adjustment policy. 
A final practical distinction between stabilisation and structural 
adjustment is that the former tends to be formulated at the 
macroeconomic or aggregative level and concerns the overall balance 
between effective demand and effective supply and their relationship to 
the full employment levels of output and employment. Structural 
adjustment policies frequently are disaggregated or microeconomic in 
design and are aimed at the sectoral, industrial or regional composition 
of production and employment. 
Structural measures can be differentiated along many different 
dimensions. A useful two-dimensional classification distinguishes first 
between measures aimed at domestic markets and measures affecting the 
5 
conditions of international exchange and second between reform of 
financial markets and reform of "real" goods and factor markets. The 
matrix in Table 1 represents this classification and provides some 
illustrative examples of the structural adjustment policies in question. 
While this paper is concerned with macroeconomic stabilisation 
policy in response to external shocks and disturbances, it is clear that 
structural issues cannot be ignored, even in the discussion of 
stabilisation policy narrowly conceived. At the very least, the 
institutional setting and rules of the game, and the domestic and 
international financial and real market structures condition the 
appropriate monetary, fiscal, exchange rate and incomes policy responses 
by developing countries to a change in the external environment. A 
temporary worsening of a country's terms of trade, for instance, will 
call for a very different macroeconomic policy response if the country 
has easy access to private international financial markets than if it is 
effectively excluded from further access to private international credit 
markets. Where optimal maroeconomic policy responses to external shocks 
depend on the nature of the structural adjustment policies that are 
being pursued, this dependence will be made explicit, 
In principle, it would be better to speak of stabilisation and 
structural aspects or consequences of a given fiscal, financial or 
monetary policy action or rule, rather than of stabilisation and 
structural policy. The inferior usage seems to be too well-ingrained, 
however, to try to dislodge it. In a number of cases, one or the other 
set of consequences clearly dominates. E.g. liberalisation of domestic 
5a 
Table 1 




Domestic Financial Reform 
Introduction of market­
determined deposit and 
loan rates 
Creation of a domestic 
equity market 
Mobilization of rural savings 
Reform of exchange controls 





Labour Market Reform 
Land reform 
Reform of public sector 
pricing and investment 
Reform of marketing 
boards 
Reform of trade policy 
Import tariffs 
Ex port subsidies 
Quotas 
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factor and goods markets or of a "repressed" domestic financial system 
would seem to have mainly structural consequences, as do policies to 
change the degree of export-orientedness of domestic production or to 
alter the extent of integration of domestic financial and goods markets 
into the global financial and trading systems. 5 (But see Buffie 
(1984)). 
Reducing public spending, lowering the rate of growth of domestic 
credit and devaluing the exchange rate to reduce domestic absorption and 
improve the external current account balance would seem to be examples 
of policies with mainly stabilization consequences. Changes in the 
volume and composition of public spending will, however, also tend to 
have important long-run structural consequences. A devaluation, 
possibly accompanied by a change in the rate of crawl of the exchange 
rate in a crawling peg regime, may also be one element in a structural 
adjustment package aimed at increasing the share of exports in domestic 
output. 
Like all forms of government intervention in the economic process, 
the case for macroeconomic stabilization policy rests on empirical 
judgements about the workings of the economic and political systems 
and/or on a normative judgement. 
5The locus classicus of financial repression is McKinnon [1973]. On 
trade liberalisation and export-promoting vs. import-substituting 
development strategies see Krueger [1978], Balassa (1982a, b, 1984), and 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan [1979), The important practical issue of the 
right order of liberalisation and reform is discussed in Harberger 
[1982), Barletta, Blejer and Landau, eds. (1983], Edwards [1984a, b, c] 
and Obstfeld [1984). 
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The empirical economic judgement concerns the presence and severity 
of market failure and the existence, taking into account only the 
6technical (or "academic") constraints on policy design, of 
performance-and-welfare-enhancing policy interventions or intervention 
rules. The empirical political or politico-economic judgement concerns 
the likelihood that these potentially feasible, performance-and 
welfare-enhancing policy measures will in fact be implemented given the 
actual political and administrative constraints on the design and 
conduct of econmic policy. 
The ethical or normative judgement that can either substitute for 
the positive diagnosis of market failure or reinforce it, concerns the 
desirability of government interventions in the income and wealth 
distribution process. The ethical judgement that any particular 
distribution of wealth and income is undesirable leads to a policy 
prescription of redistributive measures only after (and to the extent 
that) it has been complemented with the empirical politico-economic 
judgement that the proposed cure isn't worse than the disease because of 
negative side effects (in terms of efficiency and/or stabilization). 
The identification of widespread market failure is not a very 
challenging task in many developing countries las in most industrial 
countries). Of course, many of the distortions that lie behind these 
examples of market failure are the direct consequences of past and 
r.e. assuming a unified, benevolent, credible economic policy maker. 6 
B 
present government policy. The policy measures to rectify the situation 
often are of a structural or allocative rather than of a macroeconomic 
stabilization kind. For instance, the cure for financial repression 
involves the abolition of artificial ceilings on interest rates and 
other rates of return. Part of urban unemployment is due to 
artificially high wage rates in the formal urban sector (where the 
government often is a (or the) major employer and unions are stronger 
than in the rural sector), a problem that is sometimes compounded by a 
policy of paying higher food subsidies to urban than to rural consumers. 
Many other forms of government-created or government-sponsored 
market failure can be thought of. While the ultimate remedy for these 
problems lies in structural reform and not in macroeconomic policy 
intervention, as long as the structural distortions are part of the 
actual economic environment, they are apt to have important implications 
for design of macroeconomic stabilization policy. The potential for 
acute financial crowding out problems in a financially repressed economy 
will be discussed below. While one may wish for financial 
liberalization, government budgetary policy design should be sensitive 
to the actual crowding out mechanism and not to the mechanism that one 
might have hoped for. 
The forms of market failure that are the sine qua non of 
stabilization policy are ll the capital market "imperfection" that 
(most) individuals and firms cannot borrow on the same terms as their 
government and 2) the absence of instantaneous competitive market 
clearing in (some) goods and labour markets or, more accurately, the 
9 
existence and persistence of non-Walrasian, quantity-constrained 
rationing equilibria or imperfect competition equilibria in some of 
these markets. 
Even if one subscribes to the view that such non-Walrasian 
equilibria are endemic in the major industrial countries, the very 
different structure of developing countries' labour markets and their 
often very distinct composition of production make it by no means 
self-evident that stabilization approaches designed in the laboratories 
of the industrial countries' business cycles are transferable to all or 
any of the developing countries. As a first approximation it is 
probably safe to say that the larger the share of the modern industrial 
and service sectors in total GDP, and the larger the "formal" sector 
relative to the "informal" sector, the more relevant the stabilization 
policies derived from the experience of the industrial countries are 
likely to be, This means that the more developed "Southern Cone" 
countries will ignore macroeconomic stabilization policy at their peril, 
even if mutatis definitely sunt mutandis, with particular attention paid 
to important differences in the structure of the labour market, the 
capital market and in the organization of production. 
Countries with a small modern industrial sector, a large informal 
urban sector and a large share of GDP derived from subsistence 
agriculture are unlikely to provide a welcoming environment for 
traditional macroeconomic stabilization policies. Demand management 
also is unlikely to play an important role when the production of 
agricultural cash crops for a competitive global commodity market 
10 
accounts for a major share of GDP. Supply management, i.e. policies to 
maintain a competitive real exchange rate or reduce real marginal labour 
and capital costs do play a crucial role in determining overall economic 
performance, but Keynesian-style quantity-constrained demand for output 
is unlikely to hold back production; an individual country (and 
certainly the individual producer in such a country} faces a very 
elastic global demand schedule for its products. 
The identification of the observable empirical correlates of 
potentially successful stabilization policy in developing countries 
should be a research priority in the years to come. The almost 
bewildering variety of experiences, modes of economic organization and 
stages of economic development make it very unlikely that a single 
prototype policy model will serve for such a heterogeneous collection of 
countries. 
Even when this first task is done and the economic models are 
"ready to roll", the expected payoff from the practical design and 
implementation of macroeconomic stabilization policy still is uncertain. 
In the second stage of the analysis--the evaluation of the real-world 
political, administrative and institutional feasibility of economic 
performance-and welfare-enhancing stabilization policy--political 
judgement and an understanding of the art of the possible (not at all 
the comparative advantage of the economist) are essential. It is to be 
hoped that political market failure is not so serious as to preclude the 
formation of viable, effective coalitions capable either of designing 
compensation schemes that turn potential Pareto improvements into actual 
11 
Pareto improvements, or of resisting veto attempts by losers from policy 
reforms that are deemed desirable according to some generally accepted 
social welfare criterion. It is my belief that, without dismissing the 
real dangers of "destabilisation policy", there is likely to be a 
sufficient reservoir of economic understanding and political 
common-sense to make "supply side-friendly" demand management policy and 
"aggregate demand-sensitive" supply side policy a practical possibility 
in a large number of developing countries. 
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
illustrates the dangers of engaging in financial reform or trade 
liberalization without paying attention to the budgetary and monetary 
implications of such reforms. After this slight digression, Section 3 
reviews the external environment of the developing countries and Section 
4 the stabilisation policy instrument arsenal at their disposal. 
Section 5 contains a discussion of stabilisation policy responses to 
four external shocks: a deterioration in the terms of trade, a slowdown 
in the growth of export demand; an increase in the interest rates at 
which developing countries borrow abroad and an increase in the external 
rate of inflation. 
2. Budgetary, Monetary and Inflation Consequences of Two Kinds of 
Structural Reform: A Cautionary Tale 
Just as inappropriate macroeconomic stabilisation policies can 
interfere with the successful implementation of structural adjustment 
policies, so structural adjustment policies can have unexpected and 
12 
unintended macroeconomic consequences which must be taken into account 
lest both sets of policies are reversed or abandoned for entirely the 
wrong reasons. Two important examples are the budgetary, monetary and 
inflationary consequences of domestic or international financial reform 
and the budgetary consequences of export-oriented liberalization 
measures. 
Domestic financial reformi the budget deficit, seigniorage and inflation 
From the public sector budget identity we know that any excess of 
bl . d. 'G .B ei*B*) bl" (T) t bpu 1c spen 1ng t +1p + -p-- over pu 1c revenues mus e 
dB e.'1B*financed by borrowing domestically (p) 1 by borrowing abroad (-p--), by 
printing money &1p or by running down the stock of official foreign 
exchange reserves (-et,R*> 7 
p 
.JM .1B e.'1B* e.'1R*1) -+ -+ ---p p p p 
Consider the following not unrepresentative case: a country cannot 
afford to lose any more foreign exchange reserves and considers the cost 
7s is real public spending on goods and services, T real taxes net of 
transfers, i the domestic nominal interest rate, i* the foreign nominal 
interest rate, B the nominal value of domestically held public debt 
(assumed to be denominated in domestic currency), B* the nominal value 
of foreign-held public debt (assumed to be denominated in foreign 
currency), e the exchange rate (the price of foreign currency) which is, 
for simplicity, assumed to be the same for current and for capital 
transactions, P the domestic price level, M the nominal stock of 




of accumulating additional reserves to be too high. Both the internal 
8
and external debt burdens have reached their upper limits. These 
limits are to be viewed relative to some measure of debt servicing 
capacity, which for concreteness I take to be GDP. The maximal internal 
- -* debt-GDP ratio is denoted band its external counterpart b • It follows 
thats, the real seigniorage the government has to extract by printing 
new money, as a proportion of GDP, is given by 
* .aM G-T ---+ (r-g ) b + (r* + g - g lb s = PY - y y C y 
or 
* * 2) s =6 + (r-g )b + (r + g - g lb 9 
y C y 
Barring repudiation or default, band b cannot be changed, at any 
rate in the short run. For a small country the foreign real interest 
8These limits can represent both economic and political constraints. 
9 ,.. 
o is the primary public sector deficit (the deficit excluding interest 
payments) as a proportion of GDP, r is the domestic real interest rate, 
r* is the external lworldl real interest rate, Y is real GDP, g is the y 
growth rate of real GDP and g is the proportional rate of increase in 
C 
competitiveness or the proportional rate of deterioration of the terms 
of trade. 
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rate, r*, and the proportional rate of decline of the terms of trade, 
gc' are exogenous. With unrestricted international capital mobility, 
the domestic real interest rate would be governed by the external real 
interest rate. Even with restricted international capital mobility, 
there are likely to be rather strict bounds on the ability of the 
authorities to influence their debt service burden by varying the 
internal real interest rate. !O More rapid growth of real GDP, and 
therefore of the economy's capacity for servicing both internal and 
external public debt, relaxes the debt service constraint and lowers the 
real amount of revenue to be raised by seigniorage, (the inflation tax), 
for any given primary deficit. Except for this last potentially 
important channel, the only way in which the government can limit its 
need for seigniorage (for recourse to the inflation tax) is by reducing 
the primary deficit i.e. by some combination of spending cuts and/or tax 
increases. 
iOThe internal domestic market for government debt is in many instances 
of negligible importance. When private domestic banks are required to 
absorb and hold more government paper than they would willingly do at 
current interest rates, an effective tax is levied on the banks equal to 
the excess holdings times half the difference between the market rate 
and the rate paid by the government. This tax can be viewed as another 
form of seigniorage. Many developing countries have complicated 
arrangements between the government (or the central bank) and the 
private banking system. It is not uncommon for governments to borrow 
from the banks (at rates below the shadow price of funds to the banks) 
and to lend to them simultaneously through some other arrangement. This 
complicates the practice (but not the principle) of the calculation of 
seigniorage (or equivalently of the true stock of outside money or 
monetary base). 
15 
Seigniorage as a proportion of GDP, s, can be written as the 
product of the proportional rate of growth of base money, f.( _~and the 
reciprocal of v, the income velocity of circulation of base money 
or 
3) fl = sv 
Givens, an increase in the velocity of circulation of base money 
(a reduction in the demand for base money relative to income) increases 
the proportional rate of growth of the nominal stock of base money and 
thus, sooner or later, the rate of inflation. Therefore, any reform, 
financial or other, that does not lower the real interest rate paid on 
the public debt or raise the growth rate of real output, but increases 
the velocity of circulation of government base money will tend to raise 
the rate of inflation unless fiscal measures are taken to lower the 
primary deficit. Many intrinsically desirable proposals for internal 
monetary and financial reform have as one of their consequences an 
increase in the velocity of circulation of base money. The lifting of 
interest rate ceilings on commercial bank deposits, the encouragement of 
private financial innovation and the removal of artificial barriers to 
private financial intermediation all tend to enhance the availability 
and the attractiveness of financial claims (both public and private) 
16 
that pay market interest rates. Increasing international financial 
openness may lead to direct international currency substitution (e.g. 
dollarization) which depresses the demand for domestic base money (see 
Ortiz [1983]). Non-interest-bearing government money experiences a 
decline in demand; the inflation tax base shrinks. If the required 
seigniorage revenue is unchanged, the inflation tax rate will have to 
increase. To avoid higher inflation several steps are possible. If s 
is not changed, the inflation tax base can be expanded, say, by 
increased (non-interest-bearing) reserve requirements on domestic 
monetary and financial institutions. This is equivalent to imposing a 
tax on the private banking system. Alternatively scan be lowered, 
which for all practical purposes involves reducing public spending or 
raising taxes. 
The issue is important because the velocity of circulation of base 
money is much lower in many developing countries than in most 
industrialized countries, (reflecting the frequently rudimentary and/or 
repressed nature of the internal monetary and financial system) and 
seigniorage sometimes is an important source of government finance. 
Table 2 shows the importance of seigniorage as a source of revenue in a 
number of developing countries. For social, political and 
administrative reasons, the tax base in many developing countries is 
narrow and difficult to expand. The position of most industrialized 
nations is quite different both as regards the importance of seigniorage 
revenue (which tends to be negligible (see Buiter [1985]) and as regards 
the breadth and expansibility of the tax base. Table 3 shows some 
16a 
Table 2 
Seigniorage as a Percentage of GDP in Selected Developing Countries 
ID BANGLADESH EGYPT SENEGAL PHILIPPINES 
1961 NA 1.22 NA • 93 
1962 NA .82 NA 1.31 
1963 NA 5.35 -2.44 1.29 
1964 NA 4.58 • 51 -.65 
1965 NA 3.15 -.63 .79 
1966 NA -.20 -1.09 .60 
1967 NA 2.12 -1. 13 2.13 
1968 NA .32 • 92 .62 
1969 NA 1.89 -.05 -.93 
1970 NA 3.54 1.54 2.66 
1971 NA -1.55 .35 .78 
1972 NA 2.90 .33 I.BO 
1973 NA 5.39 1.36 1.00 
1974 2.36 7. 18 3.84 1. 73 
1975 -. 17 4.20 • 71 .85 
1976 . 1(i 5.42 1.03 .78 
1977 1.42 5.26 1.28 1. 40 
1978 1.77 ,:,, 97 2.31 1.56 
1979 . 94 7.62 -.95 1.53 
1980 1.07 17.52 1.88 .89 
1981 .58 9.34 3.79 .65 
1982 .58 12.83 3. 11 .34 
1983 1. 79 12.78 -.42 2.75 




Seigniorage as a Percentage of GDP in Selected Industrial Countries 
ID GERMANY JAPAN UK USA 
1961 .41 2.5(! .39 .20 
1962 .58 • 78 • 1 7 .23 
1963 .76 1.82 .3(! ll 39 
1964 1.24 l. 20 .76 .47 
1965 .74 .82 1.04 • 51 
1966 .67 l. 13 • 59 .53 
1967 -.31 1.53 .46 .45 
1968 • 72 1.58 . 38 .70 
1969 .32 1.65 • 19 . 33 
1970 2.02 1.42 1.04 .50 
1971 1.52 l. 23 -.47 • 91 
1972 2.74 2.55 1.64 . 14 
1973 .89 3. 40 2.67 .76 
1974 - • 13 1. 77 . 39 • 61 
1975 . 31 .43 .89 .47 
1976 1.07 .86 1.53 • 42 
1977 .84 • Bl • 41 • 51 
1978 1.40 1 • 4 0 .69 .83 
1979 .59 . 74 .66 .50 





'1... o ' 
.58 






1983 .53 • 51 • 13 .36 
1984 .37 • 82 .18 .37 
Source: IFS 
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illustrative examples of industrialized countries with a much higher 
income velocity of circulation of base money, a broader general tax base 
and a small and often negligible contribution of seigniorage to total 
government revenue. 
The implications of financial liberalisation for the seigniorage 
base and thus, given the public sector's revenue needs, for inflation 
are but one example of the often unfamiliar ways in which structural 
adjustment policies can have consequences for macroeconomic 
stabilisation. 
Budgetary Consequences of Outward-Looking Trade Liberalization 
Measures 
Trade liberalisation measures such as the reduction or removal of 
import tariffs or the relaxation of import licensing requirements and 
export promotion measures such as export subsidies may have important 
budgetary consequences. It is not true, of course, that lowering tariff 
rates or even abolishing tariffs altogether necessarily lowers revenue. 
A higher than unitary price elasticity of import demand or a prohibitive 
(zero revenue) tariff are obvious cases in point. Many import 
restraints furthermore take the form of non-revenue-raising, non-tariff 
barriers such as (non-auctioned) quotas. Even so, tariff revenues 
represent a significant share of total public sector revenue in a number 
of developing countries, as shown in Table 4. 
The budgetary implications of trade liberalisation must be taken 
into account lest seigniorage be forced to make up any revenue 
17a 
Table 4 
Tariff Revenues as a Percentage of Central Government Tax Revenues 
in Selected Developing Countries 
ID INDIA TURKEY GHANA 
1973 NA 13.52 13.94 
1974 19.88 14.12 12.61 
1975 17.88 13.24 17.23 
1976 16.86 16.84 15. 14 
1977 16.92 15. 14 15. 54 
1978 20.24 16.26 17.30 
1979 25.86 10.38 13. 65 
1980 27.18 5.34 12.24 
1981 28.36 4.87 14. 59 
1982 28.06 NA 11.86 
1983 NA NA 17.59 
Source: G.F.S. 
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shortfall, with adverse consequences for the rate of inflation. The 
structural adjustment implications and the macroeconmic stabilization 
aspects of the spending and/or taxation measures undertaken to 
compensate for any adverse budgetary consequences of trade 
liberalisation must be entered into the overall cost-benefit 
calculation. 11 
3. The External Environment of the Developing Countries 
The most important exogenous features of the international 
environment for developing countries are the following: 12 
1. The level and variability (both anticipated and unanticipated) 
of the terms of trade, now and expected for the future. This will 
reflect the behaviour of all price and non-price aspects of 
international trade, such as export prices, non-price conditions of 
access to export markets (such as non-tariff protectionist barriers), 
prices of final goods imports and prices of intermediate, raw materials 
and energy imports. 
Figure 1 gives the behaviour of some important international 
relative prices. It includes the terms of trade since 1970 of all 
11 For a full discussion of the macroeconmic consequences of trade 
liberalisation, see Khan and Zahler (1983) and Buffie (1984). 
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Figure 1 
The behavior of the terms:of trade for three groups of developing countries 
Source: World Bank internal calculations :: : : 
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developing countries (all}, of the low income developing countries (low) 
and of the middle income, oil exporting developing countries (oil). 
Figure 2 shows the behaviour of the dollar price and the real price of 
OPEC oil since 1960. 
2. The level and variability of the growth of world markets for 
developing country exports where developing countries are "large" 
relative to the size of the market and face a less than perfectly 
elastic world demand schedule. Four countries small enough to take 
world prices as parametric, the growth of world demand for their 
products will appear as an exogenous rise in their export prices. Again 
both current and prospective future developments matter, as do 
anticipated variability and true uncertainty. Figure 3 gives the growth 
rate since 1957 of real GDP in the industrial world, a crucial indicator 
of the growth of global markets for developing country exports. 
3. The cost and availability of external fir.ance. This includes 
the "supply conditions", now and in the future, of private and official 
external credit and aid. 
The level and variability, now and anticipated in the future, of 
U.S. dollar interest rates, both short and long, are key parameters in 
the external environment of the developing countries. The spread over 
libor at which countries actually borrow is not a good indicator of the 
external financial constraints on borrowers, as it is in part determined 
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Figure 2 
The nominal and real price of OPEC oil since 1960 
cur: weighted average OPEC crude current price (US $'s) 
con: weighted average OPEC crude constant (1980) price 
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Figure 3 
The growth rate of GDP in the industrial world(%} 
Source: IFS 
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Creditworthiness and credit ratings are in part a choice variable, at 
any rate in the long run. Where credit rationing takes place, market 
rates are a poor proxy for the shadow price of investible resources. At 
constant interest rates, the degree of external financial pressure can 
vary greatly. Figure 4 shows the behaviour since 1957 of short (RUSS) 
and long (RUSL) interest rates on U.S. dollar denominated debt. The 
availability of external resources at below-market cost is represented 
in Table 5 by the real value of private and official aid and credit 
extended at concessional rates. 
4. The level, variability and uncertainty, now and in the future 
13of the world rate of inflation. Figure 5 shows the behaviour of the 
external inflation rate faced by the developing countries since 1957. 
5. The level and variability of exchange rates between major 
industrialized countries. While this affects developing countries 
mainly through the first four channels mentioned above, it is worth 
emphasizing in its own right. There is a robust empirical regularity 
which associates a weakening of the U.S. dollar with a lower real price 
of oil and an improvement in the terms of trade of non-oil LDC's. It 
has also recently tended to be associated with lower dollar interest 
rates and a narrowing of the spread between Libor and the T-Bill rate 
[Dornbusch 1985a]. While this remains a set of observations in search 
of a theory (and could be no more than the reflection of a fortuitous 
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Source: RUSS: 1957-1969, 6 month US Treasury Bill Rate 
1970-1977, 6 month Euroaollar rate 
1978-1984 , 6 month Libor rate 
RUSL: US government long term bond rate (20 year) 
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Table 5 
Availability of Aid and Concessional Finance 
Total net IDA flows Total ODA 
(Millions of U. S. $ at 1980 constant prices) 
1975 1,727.57 31,520.00 
1978 1,222.26 33,920.00 
1979 1,481.73 33,240.00 
1980 1,553.90 36,860.00 
1981 1,924.96 34,180.00 
1982 2,470.54 33,830.00 
1983 NA 32,970.00 
Source: WDR and World Bank Debt Tables 
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Source: Percentage rate of change in GDP deflater of 
industrial countries. IFS 
21 
and once-off concurrence of events) it appears that debtor, non-oil 
developing countries have an interest in a weaker U.S. dollar. Figure 6 
contains the behaviour of the US$ effective exchange rate since 1970. 
The significance and the welfare implications of changes in these 
external parameters will of course depend crucially on the domestic 
circumstances of the country in question. E.G. an increase in export 
volume (at given terms of trade) only represents an increase in welfare 
if there are idle resources whose shadow prices are below their market 
prices, i.e. in Keynesian demand-constrained regimes rather than in 
classical or supply-constrained regimes. In what follows full 
employment (or a high level of capacity utilization), price stability 
and balance of payments equilibrium are taken to be the objectives of 
stabilisation policy. 
4. The Macroeconomic Stabilisation Policy Arsenal 
Macroeconomic stabilisation policy aims to influence the level and 
composition of effective aggregate demand as well as the level and 
composition of effective aggregate suppply in the short to medium term. 
It contains both demand management and short-run supply management. The 
main instruments are the following: 
a) Monetary policy. This includes changes in the level and/or 
rate of change of the stock of domestic credit (under a managed exchange 
rate regime) or of the money stock !under a market-determined exchange 
rate). A narrow monetary aggregate like M (or even the monetary base)
1 
is the relevant one in most developing countries other than the 
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Source: US$ effective exchange rate, IFS. (Increase denotes appreciation) 
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system. In a repressed financial system with interest rates controlled 
at below market-clearing levels and consequent credit rationing, 
variations in controlled interest rates and in the degree of stringency 
of credit rationing are further important policy instruments. Changes 
in the allocation of rationed credit between sectors or between 
consumption credit and credit for working capital or fixed capital 
14formation will also have potentially long-lasting supply side effects. 
Demand effects of monetary policy. Tight money impacts on 
aggregate demand in a familiar manner. Higher nominal and real interest 
rates and implicit and explicit required rates of return on other assets 
depress demand, reinforcing any real balance effect. More severe credit 
rationing also squeezes demand (especially inventory accumulation and 
fixed investment) 1 when financial markets are underdeveloped and/or 
repressed and bank credit is the major external source of investible 
funds for firms. With a greater or lesser lag, nominal wages and the 
general price level adjust downwards (in terms of the level or rate of 
change, depending on the nature of the monetary contraction). In the 
long run real activity effects disappear and monetary policy is 
reflected only in changes in nominal magnitudes. The duration of the 
adjustment process depends on the details of the institutions of labour 
14From the government budget identity it is clear that monetary, fiscal 
and financial policy possess one fewer degrees of freedom than one might 
have thought (or hoped). Biven the deficit and the amount of internal 
and external borrowing, domestic credit expansion is residually 
determined. 
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and product markets, but will be shorter when the monetary authorities 
are blessed with credibility as to the firmness of their long-run 
commitment to monetary control. Painless, instantaneous adjustment has 
never been observed and is not a practical possibility. 
Monetary restraint will tend to improve the official settlements 
balance of the international balance of payments under a managed 
exchange rate and put upward pressure on the nominal exchange rate path 
under a market-determined exchange rate. In the short run, nominal 
exchange rate appreciation (more or less) equals real exchange rate 
appreciation and tight money worsens international competitiveness, 
either by reducing the relative price of traded to non-traded goods 
and/or by raising the relative price of exports to imports. Where there 
is very limited international capital mobility! the behaviour of the 
current account surplus mirrors that of the official settlements 
balance. When there is a high degree of capital mobility, monetary 
policy has, under a managed exchange rate regime, a negligible effect on 
real activity and spills over directly and immediately into the overall 
balance of payments. Few developing countries are in this position. 
Effective supply side effects of monetary policy. In an economy 
with limited international capital mobility, a deceleration in the rate 
of growth of domestic credit (under a managed exchange rate) or in the 
rate of growth of the domestic money stock (under a floating exchange 
rate) will cause a temporary increase in real interest rates and/or 
(especially in a financially repressed systemi a temporary increase in 
the severity of credit rationing faced by industry. The increase in the 
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cost of working capital (or the reduction in its availability) that this 
represents acts like an adverse effective supply shock. Notional supply 
(supply in the absence of credit rationing and with the real interest 
rate equal to the marginal social cost of borrowing) exceeds effective 
supply. (See Blinder (1985]). Together with the demand-depressing 
effects of tight money, this suggests the likelihood of a transitional 
stagflationary phase in response to a deceleration of credit or money 
growth. Longer-run effects of changes in the rate of inflation 
associated with changes in the rates of growth of money on the capital 
intensity of full employment production (through Tobin effects, etc.) 
fall outside the scope of cyclical stabilisation policy and are probably 
quite insignificant quantitatively. 
Pl Fiscal policy. This includes changes in the level and 
composition of real public spending on currently produced goods and 
services ("exhaustive" spending), changes in transfer payments (social 
security, pensions) and subsidies or in eligibility and and entitlement 
rules, changes in direct and indirect tax rates etc. Aspects of 
commercial policy and of industrial policy with major public sector 
revenue consequences also properly belong to fiscal policy. (Tariffs 
and the revenue consequences of the pricing and investment policies of 
public corporations that can fall back on the government as the lender 
of first resort come to mind). 
Demand effects of fiscal policy. 
Public spending cuts and tax increases lower the level of aggregate 
demand, except in the special case of 100 percent or full crowding out. 
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In the standard IS/LM model this will occur in the short run if the 
income velocity of circulation of money is constant (unless the economy 
fixes its exchange rate and faces a perfectly elastic international 
supply schedule of capital). "Confidence effects" may lower the risk 
premia and thus nominal and real interest rates when credible policies 
to reduce fiscal deficits are implemented or announced. There is no 
evidence that these effects are sufficiently strong to reverse the 
conclusion that the impact effect of tight fiscal policy is a 
contraction of real effective demand. In the longer run, the 
accumulation of debt associated with any continuing deficit will either 
put upward pressure on real interest rates, (if it proceeds sufficiently 
rapidly to raise the debt-output ratio, the real debt burden), or lead 
to credit rationing by external creditors. Ultimately any policy 
involving a primary (non-interest) deficit and a real after-tax interest 
rate in excess of the growth rate of capacity output becomes 
unsustainable and will require correction lest the deficit be monetized 
and/or the debt repudiated. Fiscal stabilization policy must be 
reversible, i.e. should not imply any increase in the trend debt-GDP 
ratio. 
Public spending cuts also change the compositon of demand. The 
distinction between current and capital spending is crucial in this 
regard. Tax cuts will tend to crowd out private investment if they take 
the form of personal income tax cuts, but will crowd it in if they take 
the form of private investment incentives. 
In a financially repressed economy with credit rationing the degree 
of crowding out of private borrowing by public borrowing will tend to be 
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greater (for a given interest-sensitivity of the demand for money) than 
in an economy with market-clearing interest rates, and even 100 percent 
crowding out becomes a theoretical possibility again. 
Fiscal policy measures that reduce the public sector budget deficit 
also tend to reduce the current account deficit of the balance of 
payments, but less than one-for-one, except in some special cases. 
Supply side effects of fiscal policy. 
Well-designed tax cuts and cuts in benefits or entitlements can 
increase the incentives to work, save and invest, with obvious short-run 
and long-run effects on capacity output, i.e. on notional supply. The 
distributional consequences of such measures are of course central to 
any determination of their overall desirability. Cuts in exhaustive 
public spending are likely to have adverse long-run notional supply side 
consequences if they fall on public sector capital spending, (on 
infrastructure investment or investment by public enterprises) or on 
maintenance. 
Spending classified as current (e.g. education and training} may 
have an important human capital formation dimension and spending cuts 
that affect such components will have long-run adverse notional supply 
consequences. Cet. Par., lower deficits are associated with lower 
interest rates, reduced credit rationing and enhanced incentives for 
private investment. The tax increases or spending cuts that bring about 
these lower deficits may, however, adversely affect private saving and 
investment (and a fortiori total national investment if the public 
spending cuts take the form of cuts in public sector capital formation, 
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where the foregone public sector capital is complementary with private 
capital, as in the case of infrastructure). The design of fiscal policy 
is therefore a lot more complicated than the determination of the 
magnitude of the public sector financial deficit. Financial crowding 
out, especially if it occurs via credit rationing, may depress effective 
supply below national supply. 
Y) Exchange rate policy. 
Under a managed exchange rate, monetary policy becomes subordinate 
to exchange rate policy. This is true even in the very short run, if 
the degree of international capital mobility is very high and the money 
stock is demand-determined. With limited international capital 
mobility, the short-run "offset-coefficient" of reserve losses on 
domestic credit expansion is less than unity, but in the long run, money 
becomes fully endogenous again. 
Demand side effects of devaluations 
In the simple IS-LM model, devaluation expands demand if the 
Marshall-Lerner conditions are satisfied, (from an initial position of 
balanced trade, the trade balance improves if the sum of the export and 
import price elasticities exceeds unity). That this proposition is very 
model-specific is clear from the simplest one-commodity monetary model 
of the balance of payments in which relative price changes play no role 
but absorption is reduced and the trade balance is improved through the 
real balance or wealth effect of the increase in the general price level 
brought about by the devaluation of the nominal exchange rate. Even 
when devaluation does change relative prices in the short run, the 
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effect on the trade balance of such a temporary worsening of the terms 
of trade is ambiguous on theoretical and empirical grounds. A permanent 
worsening in the terms of trade, i.e. a permanent reduction in the real 
income (measured in terms of the purchasing power over the economy s 
consumption bundle) represented by a given volume of domestic 
production, might well lead to an equal reduction in consumption, with 
no effect on saving or on the trade balance. The temporary 
worsening of the terms of trade expected after a devaluation may well 
lead to a smaller reduction in current consumption than in current real 
income, because consumption is, at least in part, governed by permanent 
income which has gone down by less than current income. The result 
would be a worsening of the trade balance, not an improvement. Credit 
markets in developing countries are probably too imperfect to give too 
much weight to the permanent income hypothesis, where behaviour in 
accordance with this hypothesis would require borrowing against 
anticipated future labour income or the realization of illiquid real or 
financial assets. It remains true that the effects of devaluation on 
the trade balance and on real demand are by no means obvious, unless one 
is willing to put a very significant weight on the real balance effect, 
(which would seem to be an empirical non-starter), or on the effect of a 
devaluation on the real value of credit in a credit-rationed financial 
system with incomplete indexing of bank loans to firms. 
There are many other theories arguing the possibility of 
(short-run) adverse effects on the current account of a devaluation. 
The j-curve, which relies on low short-run demand and supply 
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elasticities is probably the best-known example. Other arguments about 
the possible contractionary demand effects of a devaluation have been 
made by Kurgman and Taylor [1978] and by Diaz-Alejandro [1981]. <See 
also Taylor [1983]). 
If the balance of trade and real demand effects are ambiguous, the 
price level effects are quite unambiguous. Devaluation raises the price 
level (through a temporary increase in the rate of inflation) in the 
long run by the same proportion. A higher rate of "crawling" 
depreciation will after a lag lead to an equal increase in the rate of 
inflation. 
Supply-side effects of devaluation 
In the short run, a devaluation will raise the price of traded 
relative to non-traded goods. Resources will flow out of the non-traded 
goods sector and into the traded goods sector. The magnitude and 
duration of this resource transfer (which will have to be reversed when 
relative prices revert to their pre-devaluation values) will be 
dependent on the expected duration of the depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. If there is short-run rigidity of money wages, and if 
employment is "real wage constrained", a devaluation and the associated 
increase in the general price level will, by temporarily lowering real 
wages, permit a temporary expansion of output supply and employment. If 
there is a rapid pass-through of cost-of-living-changes into factor 
payments, whether by de-jure or by de-facto indexation, and if 
demand-constrained employment regimes emerge frequently during cyclical 
downswings, the importance of this positive supply-side effect of a 
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devaluation is probably quite minor. The opposite argument, that 
devaluation, to the extent that it worsens the terms of trade and raises 
the real product wage corresponding to any given real consumption wage, 
15 . t t .. 11reduces 1abour deman d an d ou t pu t a1so seems un1mpor an emp1r1ca y. 
6) Exchange controls and capital controls 
It is fairly arbitrary whether one views capital controls or 
foreign exchange controls in general as instruments of stabilization 
policy or as important parameters conditioning the consequences of 
variations in the other macroeconomic policy instruments (as I would 
prefer). A good case can be made for the view that strict limits on the 
international mobility of financial capital are essential for orderly 
macroeconomic development if domestic financial markets are 
underdeveloped and domestic factor markets do not fit the idealized 
competitive paradigm. Countries that have liberalized international 
capital flows before domestic factor and goods markets have frequently 
undergone traumatic overvaluations of the exchange rate (brought about 
by rapid capital inflows), followed by a loss of confidence and a 
financial collapse with serious consequences for the real economy (see 
e.g. the Southern Cone experience reviewed in Harberger [1982], 
Barletta, Blejer and Landan eds. [1983], Edwards [1984a, b, c} and 
Obstfeld [1984]). Tight capital controls are of course quite consistent 
15E.g. with a fixed (fully indexed) real consumption wage, a worsening 
of the terms of trade raises the "product" supply price of labour and 
reduces employment where this is real-wage constrained. 
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with a welcoming attitude towards long-term foreign direct investment. 
While it is possible, in principle, to use variations in the scope and 
degree of stringency of exchange controls as a cyclical stabilization 
device, there is neither an academic literature on the subject, nor any 
practical experience. 
E) Incomes policy 
Incomes policy can be used as an instrument of nominal wage 
restraint {or wage and price restraint), i.e. as an intervention to 
achieve a given desired reduction in the rate of inflation at least cost 
in terms of output and employment forgone, or as an instrument for real 
wage control. In the latter case it will have obvious supply-side 
effects by permitting an increase in employment if this is real 
wage-constrained. By raising profit rates, private investment is likely 
to be stimulated (assuming no adverse aggregate demand effects from a 
redistribution from labour to capital), Since the public sector is a 
major (often the largest) employer in the formal sector in many 
developing countries, there will always have to be at least a public 
sector incomes policy. Policies affecting the relative wages of 
different categories of labour (young vs. adult, skilled vs. unskilled 
etc.) will have important supply side consequences but cannot be used 
easily for stabilisation purposes. Nominal incomes policy can be used 
to add credibility to monetary and fiscal disinflation programmes and to 
break through the "after you" non-cooperative stance of individual 
groups of workers in segmented labour markets. Real incomes policy is 
unlikely to meet with lasting success unless the underlying balance of 
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forces in the labour market is consonant with its objectives or is 
altered to become so. 
5. External Shocks and Domestic Policy Responses 
Before turning to a discussion of specific macroeconomic policy 
responses to particular exogenous shocks, the following five points 
should be made. First, macroeconomic stabilisation policy is (and 
should be) conducted not only in response to external shocks but also in 
response to internal shocks and disturbances that originate outside the 
government sector. Second, stabilisation policy errors (combinations of 
selecting the. wrong instrument, the wrong dosage and the wrong timing I 
often have been a source of macroeconomic disruption and an obstacle to 
efficient and fair structural adjustment. The first task of 
macroeconomic policy design is of course to prevent macroeconomic policy 
itself from putting unnecessary strain on the economic system. Third, 
there is no convincing case (but only a misapplication of the theory of 
th n best) for "correcting" misconceived macroeconomic stabilisation 
policy by making changes in structural adjustment policies that would 
not otherwise have been implemented. E.g. an excessively lax fiscal 
policy stance is likely cet. par. to result in an increased deficit on 
the current account of the balance of payments. "Correcting" such an 
imbalance through protectionist measures (such as import restrictions) 
would be unwise and counterproductive for two reasons. One, the effect 
of an increase in the degree of protection on the current account is 
ambiguous. Protection is a two-edged sword, as it tends to reduce 
international trade in general, both imports and exports. Such a 
17 
33 
reduction in the "openness" of an economy can be accompanied either by a 
16worsening or by an improvement in the current account. Two, to the 
cost of correcting a macroeconomic imbalance is added the efficiency 
loss associated with a shift in the pattern of production and resource 
allocation away from the economy's underlying comparative advantage, 
Fourth, as will become apparent in the subsequent discussion of 
specific shocks and policy responses, the effectiveness of macroeconmic 
adjustment policy and indeed the very nature and magnitude of the proper 
policy responses depend crucially on the credibility of the policy 
announcements of the government. The current behaviour of the exchange 
rate (where it is free to reflect market forces), of capital flows, of 
interest rates, of wages, prices, savings, investment, employment and 
output depends on past policy actions, on current policy actions and on 
past and current expectations concerning future policy actions. The 
effects of current fiscal and monetary policy may be reinforced or 
neutralized by the effect that current policies and current policy 
announcements have on domestic and international perceptions about the 
likely future course of policy. Credibility is a function of reputation 
16
This point is closely related to the well known theorem of the 
equivalence of an import tariff and a tax on exports in a static 
economic system with full employment and balanced trade (Lerner (1936]). 
17
Assuming the initial configuration corresponded (more closely) to the 
one dictated by comparative advantage. 
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which in turn reflects past policy actions and the extent to which 
governments can convincingly commit themselves in advance to a sequence 
of future policy moves. Multilateral institutions like the World Bank 
and the IMF can play a crucial role in supplying credibility to 
countries with poor track records, in exchange for a commitment to 
pursue structural or financial adjustment policies. 
Finally, other things being equal, larger policy responses are 
required for permanent than for transitory disturbances. (More 
generally, longer-lasting shocks require larger and/or longer-lasting 
policy responses}. Nominal shocks should not lead to policy responses 
that imply lasting real effects. E.g. higher world inflation should be 
met with a lower rate of depreciation of the home currency, not with a 
fiscal response. The policy response to shocks should begin when they 
are first anticipated, not when they finally occur. In the presence of 
adjustment costs to changes in employment, in the capital stock, in the 
sectoral allocation of resources etc., a policy response conducive to a 
gradual adjustment of these endogenous variables will in general be 
optimal, even if the shock is permanent. If adjustment costs are 
associated with variations in the values of the policy instruments 
themselves (say because of administrative bottlenecks) a gradual 
response of the policy instruments themselves will be desirable. The 
degree of confidence with which expectations concerning the future 
evolution of the external environment are held will determine the 
magnitude and speed of the policy response as well as the range of the 
policy instrumentarium to be deployed. Irreversible or 
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costly-to-reverse policy actions will tend to be postponed if the 
passage of time is likely to resolve at least some of the uncertainty. 
5a) Stabilization policy responses to a deterioration in the terms 
of trade of a small open economy. 
A deterioration in the terms of trade will, holding public 
spending, tax-transfer programmes, domestic credit expansion, the (rate 
of crawl of the) exchange rate and the pressure of incomes policy 
constant, have the following demand and supply effects. 
The real income corresponding to any given level of production of 
domestic output is lower. To prevent the emergence of a current account 
deficit, real absorption (in terms of the consumption bundle) should 
decline by the same amount as real income. If the terms of trade 
deterioration is permanent, real private consumption may well decline in 
line with real private permanent disposable income. However, there is 
no similar mechanism ensuring that the other two components of 
absorption, private investment and public exhaustive spending, will (or 
should) follow suit. 
First consider the case where the deterioration in the terms of 
trade involves the terms of trade of final consumption goods only. This 
means that private investment should stay constant in terms of home 
output, i.e. decline in terms of the consumption bundle. Real public 
consumption and investment also should remain constant in terms of home 
goods; that means a cut in volumes if part of this spending is on 
imports which now are more expensive. Contractionary fiscal policy (a 
balanced budget cut in public sector consumption spending) would seem 
the appropriate fiscal response in this case. 
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An increase in the relative price of an imported intermediate, raw 
material or energy input lowers the value added corresponding to any 
given amount of gross output. Again, private agents following permanent 
income principles would make the required corresponding reduction in 
private consumption spending. Public consumption should also be cut to 
reflect the objective worsening of the sustainable national standard of 
living. The short-run response of private and public investment, actual 
and desired, is ambiguous, however. 
A rise in the price of energy, say, is likely to reduce the 
long-run desired stock of capital and other complementary factors. In a 
vintage capital model, the energy price increase may, especially if it 
was unanticipated, lead to large-scale scrapping of energy-intensive 
older vintages, while sharply raising the return to net investment in 
new energy-efficient technology. The result could be a temporary 
investment boom, associated with a current account deficit that is quite 
sound and above board provided the returns to the investment cover the 
cost of external borrowing. 
An increase in energy prices also lowers the "warranted real 
18wage" the real wage, in terms of the price of gross domestic output 
land thus also the real consumption wage) corresponding to any given 
level of employment, including full employment. 
strictly the "warranted real marginal cost of labour", including wage 
and non~wage costs. 
18
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Without a lowering of the actual real wage, classical unemployment 
would result (if the real wage initially constrained employment). The 
warranted real rental rate of capital also declines. Any policy, 
including tighter incomes policy, that facilitates this transition to a 
lower real wage will help maintain employment. 
The deterioration in the terms of trade can either raise or lower 
the domestic general price level at a given exchange rate depending on 
whether it takes the form of an increase in dollar import prices or a 
cut in dollar export prices. Price level stabilisation calls for an 
exchange rate revaluation in the former and a devaluation in the latter 
case. There is no clear case for any monetary policy response. 
If the terms of trade worsening is pretty confidently expected to 
be long-lasting, the policy response should be as swift and as complete 
(in terms of the adjustment to the new long run equilibrium) as is 
consistent with a proper allowance for costs of adjustment. 
When the terms of trade change is in the opposite direction, the 
policy prescriptions are reversed. For net energy importers, the 
decline in the real price of energy calls for the following policy 
responses (all relative to what would have been done otherwise). 
1) - a fiscal relaxation (specifically a balanced budget increase 
in public consumption spending). 
2) - an increase in the warranted real wage, say through a 
relaxation of real incomes policy, and in the warranted real 
rental rate. 
3) - a devaluation if the relative price decline of energy 
imports is a dollar price decline of imports, a revaluation if 
it takes the form of an increase in the dollar price of 
exports. 
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4) - no monetary response 
5) - a swift and full response (subject to adjustment costs) under 
1), 2), and 3) if the oil price decline is confidently 
expected to be permanent, a slower and partial response 
otherwise. 
For net energy exporters, 2), 3), 4) and 5) are the same, but 1) 
is reversed. 
5b} Stabilization policy responses to a slowdown in the rate of 
growth of export demand for a developing country with some market power. 
In the absence of any policy response in the developing countries, 
a slowdown in the rate of growth of export demand for their output (say 
because of industrial country protectionism in the OECD or because of a 
recession in the industrial world) constitutes a contractionary shock to 
aggregate demand. The equilibrium adjustment to such a shock would be a 
transition (maintaining full employment of resources) to less favourable 
external terms of trade and a shift in the composition of production 
away from exportables and towards import-competing or non-traded goods. 
If the slowdown is perceived to be cyclical and therefore temporary, 
total absorption would, if external credit is available, decline by less 
than real income and the current account would go into deficit. 
Provided matching surpluses ate run during periods of above normal 
growth of export demand when the terms of trade have an exceptionally 
high value, such cyclical deficits are nothing to worry about. If the 
weak growth of demand and the associated unfavourable terms of trade are 
perceived as permanent, there would be no justification for maintaining 
private plus public consumption at its previous level. 
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Without proper fiscal and monetary policy responses, the actual 
transition is likely to be rather more painful than the equilibrium 
transition. Labour and product markets do not clear 
instantaneously,factor mobility is limited and excess capacity and 
unemployment will follow the deceleration of export demand growth. 
Expansionary fiscal policy could provide the short term demand stimulus 
required to maintain full employment, but unless it were to take the 
form of a "balanced budget" expansion, it would add greatly to the 
pressure on the current account. Expansionary monetary policy is called 
for, accompanied by a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate and an 
incomes policy aimed at translating nominal exchange rate depreciation 
into improvements in real competitiveness. 
5c} Stabilization policy responses to an increase in interest 
rates in the industrial world 
In the case where the increase in nominal interest rates is also an 
increase in real interest rates, even the equilibrium adjustment to the 
increased cost of borrowing will involve painful choices for the 
developing countries that are net debtors. The only exception to that 
rule would occur in the felicitous but unlikely event of an increase in 
aid and other concessional resource transfers from the industrial world 
to the developing countries, which compensates them fully for the 
increase in their debt service costs. As long as the marginal cost of 
external debt is increased, there will be a reduction in the optimal 
amount of debt for a borrowing country. The transition to this lower 
level of external indebtedness requires the debtor countries to run 
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current account surpluses, that is to effect a net transfer of resources 
to the creditor countries. First consider the case where the higher 
interest rates are considered to be a permanent feature of the external 
economic environment. At full employment, part of the required 
reduction in absorption would come from the private sector (even without 
any increase in taxes), if the increase in external real interest rates 
is reflected in the cost and/or availability of domestic credit. 
19Private investment will fall and so will private consumption. 
Attempts to insulate the domestic economy from the global increase in 
interest rates will merely postpone the inevitable adjustment process 
and may well end up making it more painful than it need have been. In 
the new high interest rate long-run equilibrium, the capital intensity 
of production will be lower than it would have been otherwise and the 
equilibrium "warranted" real wage is lower also. 
Public consumption spending too should be cut, unless the marginal 
valuation of public consumption exceeds that of private consumption over 
the entire relevant range, which would indicate a serious misallocation 
of resources in the initial equilibrium. The increase in the foreign 
rates of interest would put downward pressure on the exchange rate 
and/or induce a loss of foreign exchange reserves. 
For the economy as a whole, both substitution and income effects (in 
the case of a net debtor) favour saving. The private sector, however, 
could be a net creditor even if the private and public sectors combined 
are a net debtor. The statement in the text ignores this possibility. 
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Again the transition to the new equilibrium with its lower external 
debt burden and its lower capital intensity of production is unlikely to 
be achieved at full employment, in the absence of a well-designed 
stabilization policy package. If the exchange rate is not permitted to 
weaken, the lower aggregate demand associated with the higher real 
interest rates will cause a recession. (I am assuming that the 
effective domestic cost and/or availability of credit goes up in line 
with the external cost; if this is not permitted to happen, the 
correction of the resulting current account deficit will require other 
contractionary 1 absorption-reducing policy measures.) If the exchange 
rate is devalued (or permitted to depreciate), if nominal exchange rate 
changes correspond, at any rate in the short run, to real exchange rate 
changes and if "real devaluations" have an expansionary effect on 
demand, then employment and capacity utilization can be maintained in 
the face of an increase in world real interest rates. The devaluation 
will lead to an upward shift in the path of the price level, but there 
need be no long run increase in the rate of inflation. 
To converge to the sustainable long-run equilibrium with its 
reduced external debt, its lower capital-output and capital-labour 
ratios and its lower real wage, requires on balance a fiscal contraction 
along the adjustment path, as well as a policy for reducing real 
marginal labour costs. Unless non-wage labour costs (employers' social 
security contributions, other social premiums paid by employers as a 
function of their wage bills, and rules and regulations limiting 
managerial discretion in hiring, firing etc.) can be reduced, a cut in 
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real take-home pay is inevitable. Many of the policies that lower 
non-wage labour costs (but not all, vide relaxing employment protection 
legislation) have adverse consequences for the public sector deficit. 
This is especially unfortunate when the overall stance of fiscal policy 
should be favouring a reduction of public sector financial deficits. 
Incomes policy may well be an essential ingredient of any attempt to 
lower real wages across the board. 
If the increase in world real interest rates is expected to be 
temporary rather than permanent, there is of cause no ground for 
pursuing any long-run adjustment, and the management of the short-run 
problems should also be simplified. Larger current account surpluses 
(or smaller deficits) will have to be achieved temporarily in order to 
finance the temporary increase in the real debt service burden 
associated with the higher interest rates. A temporary tightening of 
the fiscal stance is required, and the contractionary effects of this 
combined domestic fiscal tightening and external interest rate increase 
imply the need for a balancing devaluation and monetary expansion. This 
will lead to a higher price level and therefore a temporary increase in 
inflation, but no increase in the long-run rate of inflation. The 
expansionary effect of the combined devaluation-monetary expansion will 
erode over time as the rising domestic price level restores the original 
real exchange rate and real stock of money balances. 
5dl Monetary, fiscal, exchange rate and incomes policy responses 
to an increase in the world rate of inflation 
For once the appropriate policy response is straightforward. If 
the initial domestic rate of inflation was optimal, there can be no 
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Table 6 
low con g RUSS pi e 
low 1.00 
con -.86 1. 00 
.66 -.62 1.00gy 
RUSS -.54 .74 -.53 1. 00 
pi -.47 .27 -.57 .32 l . 00 
e .24 -.14 -.69 -.17 -.64 1. 00 
Correlation matrix of six external parameters, 1970-1983 
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reason for following the rest of the world into higher inflation by 
maintaining the (proportional rate of crawl) of the exchange rate. The 
country should reduce the rate of crawl of its exchange rate by the same 
amount as the increase in the world rate of inflation, thus maintaining 
its original rate of inflation. No further monetary or fiscal action is 
required. Incomes policy too is redundant. 
5e) Stabilization policy responses to increased variability of 
the external parameters and to increased uncertainty 
These kinds of shocks can be visualized as mean-preserving 
increases in the total variance (increased variability) or in the 
unanticipated variance (increased uncertainty) of the parameters of the 
external environment. Any operational measure of the external 
instability or uncertainty faced by a country probably involves some 
(possibly quite complex) function of the variances and covariances of 
the entire set of external parameters. Furthermore, it may be 
misleading to analyze external sources'of instability and uncertainty in 
isolation from the internali domestic sources. Without attempting such 
a theoretically and empirically ambitious undertaking, some interesting 
information can be gained from a simple inspection of the correlation 
matrix of six external parameters (the terms of trade of low income 
developing countries (low), the real oil price (con) 0ECD real GDP 
growth (g ) , the short dollar interest rate (RUSS), the 0ECD rate of y 
inflation (pi) and the level of the US effective exchange rate (e)i 
during the period 1970-1983. This information is given in Table b. 
Table 7 gives the correlation matrices for four of the external 
parameters Icon, g , RUSS and pil for the subperiods 1960-1973 and y 





























-.43 1. 00 
• 77 -.45 1.00 
-.32 -.50 .07 
of 4 ex tern al parameters, 
pi 










con 4.85 24.21 .27 66.19 
gy 4.85 2.16 .93 3.50 
RUSS 5.87 10.49 4.18 13.43 
pi 4. 04 8.45 2.66 3.94 
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Tables 6 and 7 show, not surprisingly, that external shocks don't 
come in isolation. If e.g. it is fiscal policy in the OECD as a whole 
that is the source of the disturbances to the developing countries' 
external environment in a particular period, then we would expect 
declining interest rates and declining growth rates of OECD GDP to go 
together (both being the short-run consequences of contractionary fiscal 
policy). If OECD monetary policy were the major driving force instead, 
we would expect to see declining interest rates associated 
lcontempor~neouslyl with rising OECD GDP growth. 
Table 7 shows the worsening of the external environment of the 
oil-importing developing countries after 1973 in a summary fashion. The 
mean oil price shoots up and its variance increases dramatically. Mean 
growth of real GDP in the OECD is more than halved while its variance 
increases. World nominal interest rates double and the variance of 
interest rates triples. World inflation more than doubles. The strong 
positive correlation between OECD inflation and nominal interest rates 
of .84 in the early period falls to .07. The early positive correlation 
between OECD growth and the real price of ·oil (presumably reflecting 
demand effects) becomes negative in the later period as negative oil 
supply shocks dominate. Generally speakingi the correlation patterns 
differ dramatically. 
Tables 6 and 7 only show measures of total variability (anticipated 
plus unanticipated). A mechanical and imperfect measure of uncertainty 
(which is likely to overstate the true extent of ignorance because 
information other than past time series observations on the variables in 
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question is in reality used to form expectations of them) can in 
principle, given sufficient data, be obtained from the contemporaneous 
variance-covariance matrix of the residuals from a vector-autoregressive 
representation of the external environment variables. Lack of degrees 
of freedom precludes such an exercise at this stage. 
From the point of view of a debtor country, given the variability 
in its terms of trade, greater variability of the interest rates it 
faces is not necessarily a bad thing. If e.g. whenever the terms of 
trade move against a debtor country, the interest rate on its external 
debt were more likely to decline, the overall position of this country 
might well be superior to that of a country experiencing a variable (or 
uncertain) terms of trade and a constant interest rate. Negative 
covariances between adverse external shocks can provide something akin 
to portfolio diversification and thus reduce the overall riskiness of a 
country's external exposure. 
Conclusion 
While much of the knowledge concerning stabilization policy that 
has been developed in the context of the industrial world can be 
transferred, mutatis mutandis to a wide range of developing countries 
{basically those with a non-negligible modern industrial sector), 
certain important modifications to the industrial country paradigm 
deserve special attention. Rudimentary and/or repressed financial 
markets lead to credit rationing. Financial crowding out on the demand 
side and effective supply effects from fiscal and financial policy are 
likely to complicate macroeconomic management. 
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An issue worth emphasizing is the distinction between two kinds of 
devaluations. The first is a devaluation of the exchange rate that 
merely serves to speed up or facilitate a real adjustment which is 
taking place anyway. It is aimed at a correction which would, in the 
absence of the devaluation, take place through an adjustment of nominal 
prices and wages. The second is a devaluation as a means for correcting 
a persistent and well-entrenched real disequilibrium. The former will 
be successful, but the benefits will be modest. The benefits from 
achieving the latter might well be major, but the policy will be 
unsuccessful unless it is backed up by other measures. 
Without an effective real incomes policy or another set of labour 
market policies and/or industrial policies that change the balance of 
power between labour and (private or public) capital, a devaluation of 
the exchange rate is unlikely to have any lasting notional supply 
effects. As predetermined nominal contracts come up for renewal, the 
temporary effect on real wages of any incomplete indexing of wages will 
erode. 
With real wages and the real exchange rate unchanged, any 
absorption-reducing effects of a devaluation have to come through the 
real balance effect or the "real credit effect". In a reasonably 
efficient financial system with market-clearing interest rates and other 
asset returns, the real balance effect isn't likely to count for much. 
In a repressed financial system with credit rationing and incomplete 
indexing of loans, the general price level increases associated with a 
devaluation will reduce the real flow of credit. This will lower both 
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credit-constrained forms of spending (inventory accumulation, fixed 
capital formation etc.} and credit-constrained forms of production 
(production relying heavily on working capital}. The possible 
stagflationary consequences of devaluations (and of tight money} in a 
financially repressed economy cannot be ignored in the design of 
macroeconomic policy. Changes in the severity and indeed in the 
mechanism of financial crowding out under credit rationing deserve close 
attention. Blinder [1985) has argued that these lessons apply, if 
perhaps to a lesser degree, to the industrial countries as well. 
One clear implication of any analysis of policy design in a 
variable and uncertain economic environment is that such variability and 
uncertainty increase the importance ll of controlled access to 
international credit and capital markets by developing country 
governments and private agents and 2} of OECD macroeconomic policies 
conducive to the least-restricted availability of credit at low real 
interest rates. Access to international financial markets potentially 
enhances a nation's capacity for smoothing consumption over time by 
breaking the closed economy identity of absorption and income. A closed 
economy or an open economy restricted to balanced trade can use only 
variations in domestic capital formation to influence the time profile 
of total national consumption. An open economy with access to 
international credit markets can vary both domestic capital formation 
and net foreign investment in pursuit of that same objective. This 
extension of the nation's "intertemporal consumption possibility set 0 
would be important even in a world without uncertainty if countries are 
4B 
perturbed by predictable variations in the weather or in other exogenous 
variables. It is even more important when uncertainty plays a major 
role, because international credit and capital markets can provide de 
facto partial insurance against incompletely correlated national 
contingencies. 
Restrictions on capital mobility and other forms of exchange 
thcontrol are likely to be necessary in the second, third or n best 
world inhabited by most developing (and developed) countries, in order 
to protect the domestic real economy from the severe damage that a 
sudden massive influx or outflow of financial capital can cause. 
Finally, it is the responsibility of the industrial countries to ensure 
that the potential benefits from access by developing countries to 
international financial and goods markets are not thrown away or turned 
into actual losses through policies that result in persistently high 
global real interest rates, unfavourable terms of trade for developing 
countries and disappointing growth of their export markets. 
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